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BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-21-3(2)(h). The order appealed from is afinalorder disposing of all claims of
all parties.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment uponfindingsand
conclusions of the bar of Appellant's claim by the law relating to res judicata.
2. Did the failure of the Appellant to object to or appealfromthe original
Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("QUADRO") and the Amended QUADRO
1

preclude the consideration of Appellant's petition for modification of the decree of
divorce and the QUADRO.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
This Court reviews a trial court's modification determination for an abuse of
discretion. See Hill v. Hill. 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). When
questions of law regarding what constitutes a substantial change of circumstances
are involved, the decision is reviewed for correctness. £e_e State v. Leyva. 951 P.2d
738, 741 (Utah 1997).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT
There is nothing in the record which shows that Appellant preserved the
issue modifying the QUADROS.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Rule 4, Utah-Rules of Appellant Procedure provides that in a case in which
an appeal is permitted as a matter of rightfromthe trial court to the appellate court,
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the case:
The Appellant's Petition For Modification of Decree of Divorce was denied
2

by summary judgment of the trial court.
2. Course of proceedings:
Carol Lynn Adamson ("Carol")fileda Complaint for Divorce July 15, 1992,
from Ted Jay Adamson ("Ted") (R 1). The parties entered into a Stipulation And
Agreement filed November 3,1992, providing alimony for Carol and distributing
one-half of Ted's retirement pursuant to Woodward v. Woodward. 709 P.2d 393
(Utah 1985). A Judgment And Decree of Divorce was entered November 3,1992
awarding Carol one-half of Ted's retirement benefits pursuant to Woodward (R
19). Ted engaged Attorney Clark R. Ward to file a Petition for Modification of
Decree of Divorce dated July 9, 1996, requesting termination of alimony and
strikingfromthe divorce decree the provision awarding Carol the one-half of Ted's
retirement, and alleging grounds for modification that on May 1,1995, Ted was
permanently injured during his course of employment. (R 23-25). No action was
taken upon the petition filed July 9, 1996. On January 15, 1998, a QUADRO was
filed qualifying Carol for her share of benefits in a Utah pension fund and a national
pension fund ( R 26-69). On January 29, 1998, Ted filed another Petition For
Modification of Decree of Divorce by his present counsel re-alleging as grounds the
disabling injury of May 1,1995 (R 31-33). Ted's affidavit in support of his second
petition alleges that both parties have remarried, and that in February 1996, Ted
3

began drawing on his pension funds ( R 37). On January 29, 1998, Ted filed an
Objection To Qualified Domestic Relations Order (R 41). Carol filed a
memorandum opposing Ted's motion for temporary relief on February 9, 1988 (R
48-50). The court ordered that for four months Ted could continue to receive the
pension funds, which order was entered March 19, 1998 (R 55). Carol was
notified that the Plumbers and Pipefitters National Pension Fund required an
Amendment to the QUADRO because of Ted's early retirement. Carol filed a
Motion to Amend the QUADRO Conforming To the Plan's Requirements, dated
May 19,1998 (R 57). The Amended QUADRO was filed June 2,1998 (R 59-63).
No objection to the Amended QUADRO was filed by Ted nor was any appeal
taken therefrom. Carol filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 19,1999,
supported by a supplemental memorandum (R 78-81). Ted filed an opposing
memorandum on June 1, 1999. Oral argument was held on August 24, 1999 ( R
92).
3. Disposition in the lower court.
The trial court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and entered a
summary judgment denying Ted's motion to modify the decree on September 27,
1999 ( R 93-97).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
4

Most of the relevant statement of facts are contained in the Statement of the
Case supra.
No alimony was awarded Ted in the Decree of Divorce, and Ted remarried
on December 1, 1992, shortly after the Decree of Divorce was entered on
November 30,1992. Ted's wife operates a pet salon and Ted works with her in the
business. Ted was drawing on the pension funds in February 1996, before either
QUADRO was filed and no appeal was takenfromeither the QUADRO or the
Amended QUADRO. The Amended QUADRO (R 61) provides in paragraphs 610 as follows:
6. Paragraph 8 of the parties' Judgment and Decree of Divorce
provides: "That Plaintiff be, and she is, hereby awarded one-half (1/2) of
Defendant's retirement benefits pursuant to Woodward." The plaintiff as the
Alternate Payee is hereby assigned a portion of the National Pension Fund
benefit that the defendant, Participant, is currently receiving. The plan is to
make payment of the Alternate Payee's benefit directly to her.
7. Defendant began employment under the plans in 1975 and
terminated in 1995. The divorce being granted November 30, 1992, the
number of years in which the Defendant was employment under the plan
during the marrage is 14 years.
8. Plaintiffs interest in the Nation Pension Fund plan has been
determined by the plan to be a portion of the defendant's benefit, calculated
to be $195.42 per month during the lifetime of the defendant-participant.
9. Plaintiffs interest in the Plan shall be payable to her, directly, now
and in the future.
10. The Alternate Payee shall receive her benefit as a share of each
payment to which the Participant is entitled for his lifetime effective with the
first day of the month after the month in which the Fund receives a court
certified copy of this order. At his death, benefits to the Alternate Payee
5

under this order will cease. Should the Alternate Payee predecease the
Participant, her portion of his benefit, as assigned in this order will revert
back to him.
Thus, Carol's entitlement terminates on Ted's death, and Ted's wife
becomes the recipient. Also if Carol predeceases Ted, her entitlement terminates
with her death.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Both, the QUADRO and Amended QUADRO were entered more than one
year after Ted commenced receiving payments under the pension plans by reason of
his disability and early retirement. The Amended QUADRO recites that it was
amended to conform to the requirements of the participants who have already
retired (R 59). No appeal was takenfromthe Amended QUADRO. The court
only retained jurisdiction in the original QUADRO to amend the order to establish
or maintain the order's qualifications as a QUADRO under the Retirement Equity
Act of 1984 (R 29).
Pension funds are marital assets distributable as property and are not subject
to modification unless associated with alimony, and then only rarely. The
QUADRO as amended is res judicata.
There is no distinction between entitlements based on early retirement and
those available under full term retirement, both are entitlements under the same
6

plans.
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO MODIFY
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AS DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS.
The law with respect to res judicata relating to property distribution in
divorce cases is stated in 24 Am Jur. 2d 946, citing the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act Section 316(a):
Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act the provisions of a
divorce decree as to property disposition may not be revoked or
modified unless the courtfindsthe existence of conditions to justify
the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state.
A clarification of the rules with respect to modification of a decree of divorce where
installments on a property settlement agreement were intended as alimony, as
distinguishedfrompayments for an interest in property, where the former is subject
to modification and the latter are not, is set forth in the following quotation of the
opinion in Callister v. Callister. 1 Utah 2d 34,261 P.2d 944 (Utah 1953) at page 40:
"This does not mean that payments under property settlement
agreements may be modified even though incorporated into the decree.
They may not. (Citing cases.) But in such a situation there is not the
same underlying policy. The settlement of property rights should be
final in order to secure stability of titles. Support allowances on the
other hand should be subject to the discretion of the court as justice
may require
It has been loosely stated generally in passing that the
divorce court has no jurisdiction to modify a decree based upon a
property settlement agreement. (Citing cases, including Ettlinger v.
Ettlinger, supra.) However, that does not mean that the court does not
have jurisdiction on an application for modification to decide correctly
7

or incorrectly whether the decree is based upon a property settlement
agreement, and is not subject to modification, or is based upon
alimony or support allowance covenants, and is subject to
modification."
The Callister case is cited in Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980) in support
of its statement: "Accordingly, the law limits the continuing jurisdiction of the
court where a property settlement agreement has been incorporated into the
decree." Id. At 1251.
In the case of Toone v. Toone. 952 P.2d 112 (Utah App. 1998), the divorced
wife discovered 12 years after her divorce wasfinalizedthat a change in law
permitted a divorced wife to share in a husband's military retirement. She claimed
this to be a change in circumstances which would support a modification of the
divorce decree. The Court of Appeals ruled that the matter was res judicata and
there was no substantial change of circumstances. Id. at 115. The court quoted
from Jacobsen v. Jacobsen. 703 P.2d 303 (Utah 1985), "In the absence of [a
showing of substantial change in circumstances] the [divorce] decree shall not be
modified and the matters previously litigated and incorporated therein cannot be
collaterally attacked in face of the doctrine of res judicata." Id. at 305.
The Jacobsen case was one in which the husband of the second divorced
wife claimed that she promised to deed back real property to him once he settled

8

with his first wife. The decree in the second divorce was silent as to this promise,
hence the second wife's challenge to the husband's petition to modify the decree
was successful by reason of res judicata.
While some cases have allowed modification of a decree of divorce where
marital assets were related to payment of installments of alimony, there are no cases
we have found which allow modification of provisions of a decree which divide
marital assets, where the issues of alimony or support are not a concern. The
Defendant, having remarried within a few days after the divorce was entered on
November 30, 1992, the issue of alimony was permanently eliminated. Also, there
was no provision for alimony for the Defendant in the decree. The Defendant's
unfortunate accident causing his disability occurred May 1, 1995, some two and
one-half years after his remarriage. If the Defendant is in need of additional
support, the law imposes this duty upon his present wife with whom he is engaged
in business.
The QUADRO and the Amended QUADRO were entered more than a year
after Ted commenced receiving disability payments. No appeal was taken from
either QUADRO, and the court therein retained jurisdiction only to continue the
QUADRO to qualify under the Retirement Equity Act of 1984. Therefore, the
QUADRO itself excludes modification of the decree of divorce as to anything
9

associated with the plan.
POINT II. APPELLANT WAS NOT AWARDED ALIMONY IN THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND WAS SOON REMARRIED WHICH
EXCLUDES HIS CLAIM FOR ANY PROPERTY DIVISION BASED
UPON CONSIDERATION OF GRANTING OR MODIFYING DECREES
AS TO ALIMONY.
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(8) provides in part that "unless a decree of
divorce provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse."
Thus, even if Ted had been awarded alimony, it terminated upon his remarriage one
day late later.
POINT III. THE APPELLANT CITED UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §303-5(3) REGARDING RETENTION OF JURISDICTION AS TO
CUSTODY AND SUPPORT, INSTEAD OF §30-3-5(7)(g).
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(7)(g)(i) provides: "The Court has continuing
jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based
on a substantial change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce."
Any such new order would conflict with §30-3-5(8) which automatically terminates
alimony upon remarriage. Ted has been remarried since December 1, 1992.
POINT IV. CORRECTION OF APPELLANT'S MISINTERPRETATION
OF THE CASE OF WHITEHOUSE V. WHITEHOUSE.
Appellant cites Whitehouse v. Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57 (Utah Ct. App.
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1990) on pages 7 and 8 of his brief as being in support of his claim for modification
but he neglected to indicate that the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. In
the Whitehouse case, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's modificiation
of interests in real property and a retirement plan where the former husband's
employment had decreased and the former wife's income had increased. The Court
stated:
The change necessary to justify a modification of a decree of divorce
varies with the type of modification contemplated. Provisions dealing with
alimony and child support are more susceptible to alternation at a later date
because the needs that such provisions are intended to fulfill are subject to
rapid and unpredictable change. £e§ e.g.. Foulger v. Foulger. 626 P.2d 412,
414 (Utah 1981). Provisions relating to property, however, should be
modified with great reluctance. Ia\ In the interest of promoting stability in
titles, modifications in a decree of divorce affecting the "disposition of real
property are to be granted only upon a showing of compelling reasons arising
from a substantial and material change in circumstances." Id. (emphasis
added). See also Williams v. Shearwood. 688 P.2d 475,476 (Utah 1984)
(property divisions should be modified only with great reluctance and upon
compelling reasons.)
This applies a fortiori when, as in this case, a decree is based upon a
property settlement agreement, negotiated by the parties and sanctioned by
the court. Foulger. 626 P.2d at 414. In such cases, equity should not be used
as a lever to realign rights and privileges "voluntarily contracted away simply
because one has come to regret the bargain made." Lea v. Bowers. 658 P.2d
1213, 1215 (Utah 1983) (quoting Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 1248, 1250-51
(Utah 1980)).
Id. At 61.
Thus far, we have found no Utah cases which supported a modification of a
11

Decree of Divorce as to property distribution which was granted pursuant to
stipulation of the parties and none where a change of circumstances was the basis
for modification of the property distribution.
POINT V. THE RETIREMENT PLANS DO NOT DISTINGUISH
BETWEEN DISABILITY BENEFITS DUE UNDER NORMAL
RETIREMENT.
The Amended QUADRO (R 59-63) refers to Ted as the "participant" and to
Carol as the "Alternate Payee" (R 61). The QUADRO recites that it is amended to
conform to requirements where the participant has already retired. On page 3 (R
61) it states that plaintiffs interest is determined to be "a portion of the defendant's
benefit, calculated to be $195.42 per month during the lifetime of the defendantparticipant."
Therefore, the plan itself has acknowledged the early retirement and a
distribution to Carol under the same specific plan which provides for early
retirement as well as normal retirement. The QUADRO also recites "The plaintiff
as the Alternate Payee is hereby assigned a portion of the National Pension Fund
benefit that the defendant, Participant, is currently receiving." (R 61^6).
The pension plans required that the QUADRO be prepared to conform to the
plans and policies of the respective entities. The court, in executing the QUADRO
adopted, approved language of the Plans. The Plans assigned portions of the
12

benefits Ted was currently receiving to Carol, even though it specified in the last
sentence of paragraph 1 (R 60) that "Defendant retired under the Disability
Pension provision of the Plan effective April 1, 1996." Neither the Plan nor the
court regarded the disability payments as affecting the entitlement of the Alternate
Payee, Carol.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly granted summary judgment denying the petition for
modification of the decree of divorce. The judgment of the trial court should be
affirmed.
DATED this J/_ day of July, 2000.
Respectfully submitted.

s 'George fC Fadel
Attorney for Appellee.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that trie BRIEF OF APPELLEE was sent to Mr. Alan R. Stewart,
Attorney at Law, 1366 East Murray-Holladay Road, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
this J, I day of
, 2000.

eorge K. Fadel

14

George K. Fadel #1027
Attorney for Plaintiff
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: 295-2421
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
CAROL LYNN ADAMSON,
Plaintiff,

|

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DENYING
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
TED JAY ADAMSON,

iI

Civil No. 9247001125 DA

Defendant.

Judge Jon M. Memmott

The hearing on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
denying defendant's petition for modification of decree of
divorce, came on before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, District
Judge, on Tuesday the 24th day of August, 1999. Plaintiff
appeared in person and by counsel, George K. Fadel.
appeared in person and by counsel Alan R. Stewart.

Defendant
The Court

having read the memoranda filed by the parties and hearing the
arguments of counsel, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. A divorce decree was entered in this cause on November
30, 1992, pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, which
decree states in part "That plaintiff be, and she is, hereby
awarded one-half (1/2) of the Defendant's retirement benefits
pursuant to Woodward," and as such, the retirement benefits are
no different from other marital assets as to finality of
1

division.
2.

The defendant remarried on December 1, 1992.

On May 1,

1995, defendant was injured in a work-related accident and
qualified for early retirement under a Utah Pipe Trades Pension
Trust Findf and the Plumbers and Pipefitters National Pension
Fund.
3.

A Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QUADRO) was

entered on January 15f 1998, and was amended to conform to the
national plan for early retirement cases on June 2, 1998.
appeal was taken by the defendant from either QUADRO.

No

The

defendant filed his petition for modification of the decree of
divorce dated December 23f 1997, claiming that his disability
entitled him to retain all of the pension fund monthly payments
during his lifetime.

The pension fund notified both parties and

counsel that the plaintiff as alternate payee would be entitled
to her proportionate share of the national fundf $195.42 per
month during the lifetime of the defendant, and upon his death
she would not be entitled to any other benefits therefrom.
4.

The award to plaintiff of one-half of the defendant's

retirement bencjfits pursuant to Woodward was part of a
distribution of marital assets and had no relationship to alimony
or support.

As in Woodward, this is a division of marital assets

which is not dependent upon when the defendant began receiving
retirement pay.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the
following:
2

m^ \ \

o
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The QUADRO as amended is res judicata as to entitlement

of the parties in the retirement benefits of the defendant, and
the Court is without jurisdiction to modify the QUADRO as
amended, other than as stated in the amendment that the Court
retains jurisdiction to amend the QUADRO as needed to establish
or maintain the Order's qualifications under the Retirement
Equity Act of 1984.
2.

Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment denying the

Defendant's Petition for Modification of the Decree of Divorce.
3.

No costs are awarded either party.

Dated thispA- day of September, 1999.
BY THE COURT

DISTRICT JUDGE
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George K. Fadel #1027
Attorney for Plaintiff
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: 295-2421
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
CAROL LYNN ADAMSON,
Plaintiff,

]
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE

]|

vs.
TED JAY ADAMSON,
Defendant.

|

Civil No. 9247001125 DA

i

Judge Jon M. Memmott

The hearing on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
denying defendant's petition for modification of decree of
divorcef came on before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, District
Judgef on Tuesday the 24th day of Augustf 1999. Plaintiff
appeared in person and by counsel, George K. Fadel.
appeared in person and by counsel Alan R. Stewart.

Defendant
The Court

having read the memoranda filed by the parties and hearing the
arguments of counsel, and having heretofore made and entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lawf and it appearing that
Summary Judgment should be entered pursuant to Rule 56f Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, in that the pleadings, decree and other
information contained in the record show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the plaintiff is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, now therefor:
IT IS ORDEREDf ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
1

~ vCi

1.

The QUADRO as amended is res judicata as to the

entitlement of the parties to retirement benefits of the
defendant, and the Court is without jurisdiction to modify the
QUADRO as to the plaintiff's entitlement pursuant to the Decree
of Divorce entered in this cause.
2.

Summary Judgment is hereby entered denying the

defendant's motion to modify the decree of divorce.
3.

No costs are awarded either party.

Dated this

of September, 1999.
BY THE COURT

DISTRICT JUDGE
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